certiorari. 7 The district court subsequently ordered Washington state's Department of Fisheries to adopt regulations implementing the judicially affirmed treaty rights. 8 New regulations were adopted but were immediately challenged by private citizens in suits commenced in Washington state courts. 9 Two such cases reached the Washington Supreme Court,1°w hich interpreted the treaties as granting to the tribes merely a right to compete with nontreaty fishermen on an individual basis." The state's highest court held that the district court's recognition of special allocation rights for treaty Indians violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 It further held that Washington's Fisheries Department lacked authority to adopt enforcement regulations in compliance with the district court's order protecting the treaty rights."
In response to these decisions, the federal district court entered a series of orders enabling it, with the aid of federal law enforcement agencies, to supervise the state's fisheries directly to preserve the treaty fishing rights.' " The district court's power to take such action was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the federal and state cases, 16 which were consolidated for review. In 10. Id. (both cases). 11. The court stubbornly said, "Being cited no authority for the proposition that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdictional [sic] to construe Indian treatiestreaties which affect important interests of the state-we adhere to our own interpretation of the treaty." Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wash. 2d at 679, 565 P.2d at 1158. 12. "[ihe granting of more than 50 percent of the harvestable fish to .028 percent of the population (treaty Indians) and less than 50 percent to 2,243,069 non-Indian population, violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution." Washington State Comm'I Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wash. 2d 276, 285-86, 571 P.2d 1373, 1378 (1977) .
13. This holding was a principal reason why the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the instant case. See Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 674 (1979 9 The Court found that the treaty language secured to the Indian tribes the fight to harvest up to 50 percent of each run of fish that passed through tribal fishing areas, rather than merely a right to compete with nontreaty fishermen on an individual basis. 2 " The Court, however, left the door open to future modifications; exact allocations to the tribes could be reduced if tribal needs could be satisfied by a lesser amount. 2 ' Finally, the Court held that the state regulations prohibiting compliance with the district court's orders could not survive the mandate of the supremacy clause; 2 2 hence, Washington's Fisheries Department could be ordered to adopt regulations implementing the district court's interpretation of the treaty fishing rights. 23 
I. Background

A. The Subject of Litigation: Anadromous Fish
The contested resource in the instant case was anadromous fish; that is, salmon and trout that spend successive portions of their life cycles in fresh, then salt, and finally fresh water. 2 " Five species of salmon-chinook, coho, chum, pink, and sockeye-and one species of trout-steelhead-comprise the resource over which the state of Washington and treaty and nontreaty fishermen have fought so fervently in the last decade. These fish are caught or "harvested" 26 at a rate of approximately eight million fish a year. 27 The annual value of the harvested salmon resource in the Puget Sound alone approaches $50 million. 2 " More than 6,600 nontreaty fishermen and about 800 treaty Indians made their livelihood by commercial fishing in' Washirigton state. 2 9 In addition, more than 280,000 individuals are licensed for sport fishing in the state. 30 For centuries, the treaty tribes have depended on anadromous fish for their livelihood, subsistence, and religious customs. 3 , Because the migrating fish are not confined to inland lakes or other restricted areas, the tribes argue that without special allotment protection, their fishery resource will be depleted before reaching the treaty fishing sites.1 2 While regulation of the anadromous fisheries in the Pacific Northwest is complicated by the migrating habits of the fish, the principal confusion has involved the treaties reserving the tribal fishing rights and the question of how to interpret those rights.
B. The Tribal Treaties
To secure land for settlement in what is now the state of Washington, the United States in 1854 and 1855 entered into six treaties 33 with the various Pacific Northwest Indian tribes. The 26. As the term "harvest" suggests, the management of anadromous fisheries in the state of Washington is similar in many respects to the cultivation of crops. The "harvestable" number of fish is the number that can be caught within conservation limits. https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss1/7 NOTES tribes held large tracts of land, stretching along the many rivers and streams of the Washington Territory to the Puget Sound. 34 The Indian population at this time had diminished to less than 8 , 0 0 0 .31 White settlers, numbering no more than 2,000,36 depended on the more expert Indians to supply them with salmon and trout. 37 In exchange for ceding their land to the United States, the tribes received monetary payments, small parcels of land for their exclusive use, and other guarantees, including the protection of their tribal fishing practices on the reservations. 3 8 In addition, each of the six treaties contains a provision securing offreservation fishing rights. The following is typical:
The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing together with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries . . . on open and unclaimed lands. .. . Four different interpretations of the "in common with" treaty language have been advanced over the last several years of litigation: (1) the treaties guarantee to the tribes only a right of access over private lands to usual and accustomed tribal fishing grounds; they require no allocation to the Indians of a specified share of the runs passing through the traditional tribal fishing areas; 40 (2) the treaties secure to the tribes either a 50 percent share of the harvestable fish that pass through their fishing places, or the amount that fulfills their reasonable needs, whichever is less; 4 " (3) the treaties reserve to the tribes a preexisting right to as many fish as commercial and subsistence needs dictate, even exceeding half the harvestable resource if necessary; 42 and (4) Resolving this treaty interpretation conflict requires looking to the historical setting of the treaty negotiations. Contemporaneous writings, treaty minutes, and other available information strongly indicate the original intent of the government was to provide the Indians merely with the right of access to their traditional fishing grounds.
While negotiating the treaties with the tribes, Isaac Stevens, governor of the Washington Territory, clarified in a letter to his superiors the intent of the government's offer to the Indians: "They would have the right of travelling throughout the country for lawful business; fishing at accustomed places in common with the whites. And going to the mountains for berries. . . .", ' This understanding-that the parties were bargaining for the right of common access to the fishery-was also reflected in a report by George Gibbs, frequently referred to as the "author" of the treaties: "[T]hey [the Indians] require the liberty of motion for the purpose of seeking, in their proper season, roots, berries, and fish, where those articles can be found." 4 5 On more than one occasion, the tribes were informed they were bargaining for a right of access to the then abundant fish resource. Governor Stevens, in his negotiations at the Treaty of Point Elliot on Monday, January 22, 1855, stated:
We want to place you in homes where you can cultivate the soil, using potatoes and other articles of food, and where you will be able to pass in canoes over the waters of the Sound and catch fish and back to the mountains to get roots and berries." On a second occasion, an agent of the United States explained to the Indians that if they would relinquish all but small reserves of their lands, "the privilege was given of going wherever else they pleased to fish and work for the whites." ' 47 On the other hand, there is evidence that the intent of the Indians at the treaty negotiations may not have been rooted solely in obtaining a right of access but in securing a permanent food resource for the tribes. One-lun-teh-tat, a Skokomish Indian spokesman at the treaty negotiations, said: I wish to speak my mind as to selling the land-Great Chief. What shall we eat if we do so? Our only food is berries, deer Although a study of the contemporaneous written and oral representations made during treaty negotiations is helpful, understanding the true intent of the treaties is complicated by the fact that communication between the parties was obstructed by both language and cultural barriers. The vast majority of Indians at the treaty councils did not speak or understand English. The treaty provisions were written in English; clauses often were drafted before any formal meeting at a treaty ground. 50 At the negotiations, the treaty provisions and the remarks of the negotiators were interpreted in Chinook jargon. 5 ' Unfortunately, many of the Indians themselves could not understand Chinook jargon; therefore, the jargon was translated into native language by Indian interpreters. 5 2
Chinook jargon provided a simple 300-word commercial vocabulary that did not include words corresponding to many of the treaty terms. 53 For example, there were no words for "common," "usual," "accustomed," "citizens," "steelhead," and other phrases, many of which have become controversial in the interpretation of the treaties. 5 4 Despite the language limitations, the treaty negotiations apparently were viewed as a success by the parties. Although the tribes had given up almost all the land that they had aboriginally possessed, they assumed that they had received a fair bargain. On January 31, 1855, at the close of the treaty negotiations, Governor Stevens met with the chiefs and headmen of the Makah Tribe at Neah Bay. The signing ceremony is recorded as follows: 
1980]
Published good." The Indians gave three cheers or shouts as each concluded. The Governor then signed the treaty, and was followed by the Indian chiefs and principal men."
The presentation of white flags by the tribes symbolized their feeling that the United States had dealt fairly with them and that their right to fish, the nucleus of their culture, had been preserved. The responsibility was then left to the courts to interpret how the treaties were intended to secure this right.
C. The Applicable Cases
Four cases litigated in the state of Washington and ultimately decided in the United States Supreme Court have confronted the treaty language involved in the instant case. These cases have provided some ammunition for both sides concerning whether the treaties secure to the Indians merely access and an equal opportunity with others to fish, or whether the treaties guarantee a specific share of the fish to the tribes.
United States v. Winans
In United States v. Winans," the United States brought suit on behalf of the Yakima Nation to enjoin nontreaty fishermen from obstruction of the tribe's treaty fishing rights on the Columbia River in Washington state." The nontreaty fishermen had obtained title claims under United States patents to lands bordering on the Columbia River. They also had obtained licenses from the state to maintain devices for taking fish called "fish wheels." 8 The United States Supreme Court rejected the lower court's finding that the 1855 treaty gave no additional fishing rights to the tribes than it gave to any other state inhabitant. The Court considered such a view "an impotent outcome to negotiations and a convention, which seemed to promise more and give the [Vol. 8 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss1/7 NOTES word of the Nation for more." 59 Stressing that the tribe's treaty right to fish was as "necessary to the existence of the Indians [as] the atmosphere they breathed, ' 6 the Court found that the Yakima Treaty secured to the tribe "a right in the land-the right of crossing it to the river-the right to occupy it to the extent and for the purpose mentioned." ' 6 ' In other words, the treaty "fixes in the land such easements as enables the right [of access] to be exercised." ' 6 2 Because the nontreaty fishermen's use of the fish wheels gave them in effect "exclusive possession of the fishing places, ' " 63 they were enjoined from using the fish wheels until an "adjustment and accommodation ' " ' 6 between the treaty and nontreaty fishermen could be effected.
Relying on the Court's instructions in Winans calling for an "adjustment and accommodation," advocates for the tribes in the instant case argued that Winans requires more than mere right of access-that the anadromous fishery should be fairly apportioned between treaty and nontreaty fishermen. 6 5 Washington state disagreed, reasoning that the relevant point in Winans was the exclusive possession of the space occupied by the fish wheels, which interfered with the Indians' treaty right of access to the fishery.
A closer look at the Winans decision reveals that the latter interpretation is more accurate. When the Court spoke of an "adjustment and accommodation," it was referring to a suggestion made by the Solicitor General in the United States' Brief. 66 The "adjustment and accommodation" discussed in the government's brief, and referred to in Winans, was in the context of arguing the right of access to the trapped fish in the fish wheels, rather than apportionment of equal shares. The Solicitor General argued:
A decree for appellants [the Indians] must consider the reasonable rights of both parties; restricting the fish wheels if they can be maintained at all, as to their number, method and While the Winans decision, therefore, speaks in terms of an "accommodation and adjustment," the case viewed in toto seems to support the treaty interpretation that the tribes were guaranteed access to their usual and accustomed fishing grounds, rather than an equal share of the harvestable fish. 68 
Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup I)
More than sixty years after Winans, the Supreme Court was again faced with adjudicating fishing rights involving one of the 1855 treaties. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup V )69 involved the construction of the Treaty of Medicine Creek made with the Puyallup and Nisqually Indians. 7° The principal issue was the constitutionality of certain conservation measures adopted by the state of Washington that allegedly impinged the tribes' treaty fishing rights.
The Puyallup and Nisqually Indians were using set nets to harvest fish in their respective off-reservation fishing grounds. The nets were illegal under the conservation laws adopted by the state. The Supreme Court held that "the manner of fishing, the size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the Indians."'
The Court found, however, that the lower court's decision had not clearly resolved the question of whether barring the use of set nets and allowing only hook and line fishing was a reasonable and necessary conservation measure; therefore, the case was remanded for determination of that question. 72. 391 U.S. at 399.
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The importance of Puyallup I, in terms of the controversy in the instant case, is that the Court described the treaty fishing right as the "right to fish 'at all usual and accustomed' places." ' 7 3
The emphasis, therefore, was on access, rather than a right to an equal percentage of the fish. Once again, however, the Court provided some language that could be used by later proponents of the equal share theory. In remanding the case for resolution of the conservation issue, the Court instructed that "the issue of equal protection implicit in the phrase 'in common with"' would also have to be addressed. 74 In subsequent cases, the tribes would argue that "equal protection" mandates an equal division of the fishery resource.
7 "
Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II)
After the remand in Puyallup I, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the Department of Game's total prohibition of net fishing for steelhead trout. In Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 7 1 the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that unfair discrimination existed in the prohibition because "all Indian net fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing entirely pre-empted by non-Indians is allowed. ' 77 The Supreme Court then'proposed that a formula was needed to apportion between the treaty and nontreaty fishermen the number of fish that could be caught. The Court stated:
At issue presently is the problem of accommodating net fishing by the Puyallups. with conservation needs of the river. . . . If hook-and-line fishermen now catch all the steel-head which can be caught within the limits needed for escapement, then that number must in some manner be fairly apportioned between Indian net fishing and non-Indian sports fishing. 
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Published s° the Supreme Court upheld an order allowing 45 percent of the natural" steelhead run to be taken by the Puyallup Indians through commercial net fishing.1 2 The majority recognized that the treaties secured to the Indians more than merely a right to compete with nontreaty fishermen on an individual basis. However, the case made it clear that treaty Indians could not rely on their treaty rights to exclude other citizens from receiving a fair apportionment. Not only were the tribes restricted to a specified percentage of steelhead taken off their reservations, but also the tribes could not claim an exclusive right to take steelhead passing through their reservations. 8 [Vol. 8 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss1/7 NOTES a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century. ' " 6 Because of the widespread defiance of the district court's orders and the unusual significance of the treaty fishing rights issue in the Pacific Northwest, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the state and federal cases 87 and set out to decide the proper interpretation of the pertinent treaty language. 88 The Court looked to the historical setting of the treaty negotiations as an aid in discovering the original intent of the parties to the treaties. 8 9 The majority summarily rejected the equal opportunity theory proposed by the state, 9 0 reasoning that the idea that each individual Indian would share an "equal opportunity" with thousands of newly arrived individual settlers is totally foreign to the spirit of the negotiations. Such a "right," along with the $207,500 paid the Indians, would hardly have been sufficient to compensate them for the millions of acres they ceded to the Territory. 9 ' Instead, the Court adopted an "equitable measure" of allocating the anadromous fish resource between treaty and nontreaty fishermen. 92 The majority first determined that under the "in common with" language of the treaties the Indians are entitled to take up to 50 percent of the harvestable runs passing through their usual and accustomed fishing grounds. 93 This 50 percent allocation, however, was meant as a maximum, not as a minimum figure. The instant case may be criticized as an example of the Court exercising prerogatives of treaty adjustment and accommodation that have been specifically reserved for Congress.' 36 A practical look at the circumstances surrounding this controversy, however, indicates that the Court really had no choice but to assure an active posture in resolving the instant case.
Justification for the Supreme Court's Active Posture
Congressional inactivity, a litigious society, recalcitrant state and local officials, together with a controversy of dangerous proportions, provide justification for the Supreme Court's apparent overstepping into a legislative role to determine tribal treaty rights. The Court should not bear the blame for assuring an active posture when both the citizens of a state and the federal government look to it for resolution of a controversy. The parties to the instant case assumed the conflict could be resolved only by the United States Supreme Court. 37 Even the Congress looked to the Supreme Court and encouraged it to make an "authoritative resolution."'
